To
understand when, why and how the CIA got involved in the newly
independent country (by that time) Republic of Congo, it is necessary
to look back in history.
Knowing
beforehand that in the 50s the main focus of the United States was to
stop communism, the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa from the
late 1950s to the mid-1970s resulted in several Cold War
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union over
the dozens of newly independent, non-aligned nations.
From
1960 to 1968, CIA conducted a series of fast-paced, multifaceted
covert action (CA) operations the Congo (the Democratic Republic of
the Congo today) to stabilize the government and minimize communist
influence in a strategically vital, resource-rich location in
central Africa. (Robarge, Para 1) To add up, the
CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), described the
situation in the Congo as a classic Communist takeover.
The
reports of the Agency showed, coupled with the arrival of Soviet bloc
technicians, convinced members of the national security team that
Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister elected by the Congolese, had to
be removed. A flurry of U.S. diplomatic activity in support of
unseating Lumumba resulted. Plans were also developed to assassinate
Lumumba if necessary. Moreover “evidence strongly suggests the
Station Chief withheld his advance knowledge of Lumumba's fatal
transfer from Washington policymakers, who might have blocked it.”
(Weissman)
On
September 5, Joseph Kasavubu, elected president, dismissed Lumumba
from the government. Lumumba ignored the decree and dismissed
Kasavubu. Lumumba’s supporters in the Congo and abroad were
outraged and pledged to support his return to office. In an attempt
to avoid civil war, Colonel Joseph Mobutu of the Congolese National
Army (CNA) orchestrated a coup d’état on September 14, and ordered
the Soviets out of the country. Mobutu’s early efforts to support
a pro-Western government and his ties to the military placed him in
good stead with Devlin, who informed Mobutu of a plot to assassinate
him on September 18. Lumumba, who was blamed for the plot, was
arrested and ultimately killed on January 17, 1961.
Over
the next four years, as the Republic of the Congo installed a series
of prime ministers, the United States repeatedly attempted to create
a stable, pro-Western regime through vote buying and financial
support for pro-Western candidates. Mobutu also received funds to
help him gain the loyalty of the CNA and avoid rebellion in the
ranks. Neither effort succeeded in suppressing the apparently endless
conflict in the unstable provinces.
Concern
over the instability that would occur following the departure of
United Nations troops led the Kennedy administration to sign
bilateral military agreements with the Republic of the Congo and
resulted in a May 1963 visit to Washington by Mobutu, who met with
President Kennedy on May 31.
Support
for the Congo continued unabated during the Johnson administration.
U.S. military assistance increased dramatically in response to the
fall of Stanleyville (Kisangani) to rebel forces on August 4, 1964.
Planes provided by the Department of Defense, flown by pilots
supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency, increased the CNA’s
efforts against a progressively robust rebel insurgency, which
received support from neighboring African nations, the Soviet bloc
and Chinese Communists. The United States also made diplomatic
approaches to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to secure
support for the Republic of the Congo.
By
late October, the situation in Stanleyville was awful. On October 28,
the rebel army commander placed all Westerners in the area (including
a number of Americans) under house arrest. Smaller but significant
numbers of hostages were held in other cities under rebel control.
A
combined U.S.-Belgian effort to rescue the hostages in late November,
Operation Dragon Rouge, succeeded but severely damaged Prime Minister
Tshombe, who was viewed as ineffectual by both Kasavubu and Mobutu.
He was dismissed in October 1965 and once again, the nation teetered
on the brink of civil war. Mobutu orchestrated another coup d’état
on November 25, 1965, removed both the President and Prime Minister,
and took control of the government.
Despite
periodic uprisings and unrest, Mobutu ruled the Congo (renamed Zaire
in 1971) until the mid-1990s. Viewed as mercurial and occasionally
irrational, Mobutu nonetheless proved to be a staunch ally against
Communist encroachment in Africa. As such, he received extensive U.S.
financial and political support, which increased his stature in much
of Sub-Saharan Africa where he often served the interests of
administrations from Johnson through Reagan.
The
overall program (the largest in the CIA’s history up until then)
comprised activities dealing with regime change, political
action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction,
as well as support to a spectacular hostage rescue mission. According
to David Robarge, by the time the operations ended, CIA had spent
nearly $12 million (over $80 million today) in accomplishing the
Eisenhower. (Robarge para 1)
Some
elements of the program, particularly the notorious assassination
plot against Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that was extensively
recounted in 1975 in one of the Church Committee’s reports, have
been described in open sources.
CIA’s
program initially focused on removing Lumumba, not only through
assassination if necessary but also with a display of nonlethal
undertakings that showed the Agency’s clear understanding of
the Congo’s political dynamics. The activities included contacts
with oppositionists who were working to get rid of Lumumba with
parliamentary action; payments to army commander Mobutu to ensure the
loyalty of key officers and the support of legislative leaders;
street demonstrations; and “black” broadcasts from a radio
station in nearby Brazzaville, across the border in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, to encourage a revolt against Lumumba.
CIA
used an extensive assortment of covert techniques to accomplish that
objective:
- Advice and subsidies to political and tribal leaders.
- Funds to Mobutu to buy the allegiances of army officers through salary subsidies and purchases of ordnance and communications and transportation equipment.
- Payments to agents of influence in the Adoula administration and to sources in the leftist opposition.
- Parliamentary guiding assisted by covert money.
- Contacts with labor unions and student associations.
- Newspaper subsidies, radio broadcasts, leaflet distributions, and street demonstrations.
- Efforts to influence delegations from the United Nations (UN) to adopt positions that favored the Congolese government.
As
Jeffrey Michael suggests, this operation was notable because the
CIA's primary function was to prevent the need for the U.S. military
to become involved in the situation rather than to enable its
intervention.
Work
cited page
Robarge,
David. CIA’s Covert Operations in the
Congo, 1960–1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents.
N.p.: n.p., 2014. Web. 24 Mar. 2016.
"The
Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965." U.S.
Department of State-Office of the Historian.
N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Mar. 2016.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization>.
Michaels, J.H. "Breaking the Rules: The CIA
and Counterinsurgency in the Congo 1964-1965." International
Journal Of Intelligence And Counterintelligence 25.1 (2012):
130-159. Scopus®. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.


