CIA’s covert operation in the Congo 1960-1968

To understand when, why and how the CIA got involved in the newly independent country (by that time) Republic of Congo, it is necessary to look back in history.

Knowing beforehand that in the 50s the main focus of the United States was to stop communism, the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s resulted in several Cold War confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the dozens of newly independent, non-aligned nations.

From 1960 to 1968, CIA conduct­ed a series of fast-paced, multifaceted covert action (CA) operations the Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo today) to stabilize the government and minimize communist influence in a strategically vital, re­source-rich location in central Africa. (Robarge, Para 1) To add up, the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), described the situation in the Congo as a classic Communist takeover.

The reports of the Agency showed, coupled with the arrival of Soviet bloc technicians, convinced members of the national security team that Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister elected by the Congolese, had to be removed. A flurry of U.S. diplomatic activity in support of unseating Lumumba resulted. Plans were also developed to assassinate Lumumba if necessary. Moreover “evidence strongly suggests the Station Chief withheld his advance knowledge of Lumumba's fatal transfer from Washington policymakers, who might have blocked it.” (Weissman)

On September 5, Joseph Kasavubu, elected president, dismissed Lumumba from the government. Lumumba ignored the decree and dismissed Kasavubu. Lumumba’s supporters in the Congo and abroad were outraged and pledged to support his return to office. In an attempt to avoid civil war, Colonel Joseph Mobutu of the Congolese National Army (CNA) orchestrated a coup d’état on September 14, and ordered the Soviets out of the country. Mobutu’s early efforts to support a pro-Western government and his ties to the military placed him in good stead with Devlin, who informed Mobutu of a plot to assassinate him on September 18. Lumumba, who was blamed for the plot, was arrested and ultimately killed on January 17, 1961.

Over the next four years, as the Republic of the Congo installed a series of prime ministers, the United States repeatedly attempted to create a stable, pro-Western regime through vote buying and financial support for pro-Western candidates. Mobutu also received funds to help him gain the loyalty of the CNA and avoid rebellion in the ranks. Neither effort succeeded in suppressing the apparently endless conflict in the unstable provinces.

Concern over the instability that would occur following the departure of United Nations troops led the Kennedy administration to sign bilateral military agreements with the Republic of the Congo and resulted in a May 1963 visit to Washington by Mobutu, who met with President Kennedy on May 31.

Support for the Congo continued unabated during the Johnson administration. U.S. military assistance increased dramatically in response to the fall of Stanleyville (Kisangani) to rebel forces on August 4, 1964. Planes provided by the Department of Defense, flown by pilots supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency, increased the CNA’s efforts against a progressively robust rebel insurgency, which received support from neighboring African nations, the Soviet bloc and Chinese Communists. The United States also made diplomatic approaches to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to secure support for the Republic of the Congo.

By late October, the situation in Stanleyville was awful. On October 28, the rebel army commander placed all Westerners in the area (including a number of Americans) under house arrest. Smaller but significant numbers of hostages were held in other cities under rebel control.

A combined U.S.-Belgian effort to rescue the hostages in late November, Operation Dragon Rouge, succeeded but severely damaged Prime Minister Tshombe, who was viewed as ineffectual by both Kasavubu and Mobutu. He was dismissed in October 1965 and once again, the nation teetered on the brink of civil war. Mobutu orchestrated another coup d’état on November 25, 1965, removed both the President and Prime Minister, and took control of the government.

Despite periodic uprisings and unrest, Mobutu ruled the Congo (renamed Zaire in 1971) until the mid-1990s. Viewed as mercurial and occasionally irrational, Mobutu nonetheless proved to be a staunch ally against Communist encroachment in Africa. As such, he received extensive U.S. financial and political support, which increased his stature in much of Sub-Saharan Africa where he often served the interests of administrations from Johnson through Reagan.

The overall program (the largest in the CIA’s history up until then) com­prised activities dealing with regime change, political action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction, as well as support to a spectacular hostage rescue mission. According to David Robarge, by the time the operations ended, CIA had spent nearly $12 million (over $80 million today) in accom­plishing the Eisenhower. (Robarge para 1)

Some elements of the program, particularly the notorious assassi­nation plot against Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that was exten­sively recounted in 1975 in one of the Church Committee’s reports, have been described in open sources.

CIA’s program initially focused on removing Lumumba, not only through assassination if necessary but also with a display of nonlethal un­dertakings that showed the Agency’s clear understanding of the Congo’s political dynamics. The activities included contacts with oppositionists who were working to get rid of Lumumba with parliamentary action; payments to army commander Mobutu to ensure the loyalty of key officers and the support of legislative leaders; street demonstrations; and “black” broadcasts from a radio station in nearby Brazzaville, across the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encourage a revolt against Lumumba.

CIA used an extensive assortment of covert techniques to accomplish that objective:

1. Advice and subsidies to political and tribal leaders.
2. Funds to Mobutu to buy the alle­giances of army officers through salary subsidies and purchases of ordnance and communications and transportation equipment.
3. Payments to agents of influence in the Adoula administration and to sources in the leftist opposition.
4. Parliamentary guiding assisted by covert money.
5. Contacts with labor unions and student associations.
6. Newspaper subsidies, radio broad­casts, leaflet distributions, and street demonstrations.
7. Efforts to influence delegations from the United Nations (UN) to adopt positions that favored the Congolese government.

As Jeffrey Michael suggests, this operation was notable because the CIA's primary function was to prevent the need for the U.S. military to become involved in the situation rather than to enable its intervention.

Work cited page

Robarge, David. CIA’s Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents. N.p.: n.p., 2014. Web. 24 Mar. 2016.

"The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965." U.S. Department of State-Office of the Historian. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Mar. 2016. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization>.

Michaels, J.H. "Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo 1964-1965." International Journal Of Intelligence And Counterintelligence 25.1 (2012): 130-159. Scopus®. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.